Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1985

Press-Enterprise co. v. Superior Court of California for the County
of Riverside
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure
Commons

Recommended Citation
Press-Enterprise co. v. Superior Court of California for the County of Riverside . Supreme Court Case Files
Collection. Box 126. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of
Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

~5/C.-l-~~

rY24fhl-

Pf ~ Lo

-t1-t__

~~
~

I

a-~.~~~~--e
~~~~~~~

hde-~~~~
~4~&e-L\ I TL.-~
~.-c.&/~ .
~

~

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

~ ~ P"ti..iA ~ ~·

May 23, 1985 Conference l i
List 1, Sheetl
r-~~ 4,

7~

PRESS-ENTERPRISE CO.
(newspaper publisher)

v.

*'

COURT~

Q!'~

d

~~

~ a-:1-

No. 84-1560

SUPERIOR

2

/

~~j.---- ---,-~s .

Cert to Cal. S. Ct.
(Broussard, Bird,
Mosk, Kaus, Reynoso;
Grodin [cone]; Lucas
[cone & d iss] )
State/Civil

Timely

c~~;-~~~

~~~1.

SUMMARY:

j

Petr cont ends that the California Supreme

~

Court erred in holding that there is no First Amendment right of

t?z--v .;._

access to a preliminary hearing in a criminal case.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

One Robert Diaz was charged

by California authorities with multiple murders.

A

/6'f.~l...,...

preliminary ~

hearing to determine whether the charges were supported by

I

~

motion under California Penal Code §868, the municipal court
closed the preliminary hearing to the publi6 and the press.
Following the hearing, which lasted 41 days, the court determined
-------~-~-~

that there was probable cause, and petr was held to answer in the
Superior Court for Riverside County on 12 counts of murder.

Petr

then moved in the Superior Court for access to the transcript of

--------------- - · ----------The court denied the motion, holding

---'-

the preliminary hearing.

that there was a "reasonable likelihood that making all or any
part of the transcript public might prejudice the defendant's
right to a fair and impartial trial."
Petr appealed

~ornia

Court of Appeal.

The court

rejected petr's argument that the federal and state constitutions
established a right of access to preliminary hearings.

Although

acknowledging that this Court had recognized a First Amendment

v----

right of access to criminal trials, see Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457

u.s.

596 (1982), and that some courts had

extended this right to certain pretrial proceedings, the court

-

followed an earlier decision of the California Supreme Court, San
Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498 (1982), in
holding that a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is
probable cause to proceed against a defendant is different enough
from a trial to make the right of access inapplicable.

Turning

-

to California Penal Code §868, which provides that "upon the
request of the defendant and a finding by the magistrate that

--

exclusion of the public is necessary in order to protect the

shall exclude from the

.-

"

-2motion under California Penal Code §868, the municipal court
closed the preliminary hearing to the public and the press.
Following the hearing, which lasted 41 days, the court determined
------~-~~

that there was probable cause, and petr was held to answer in the
Superior Court for Riverside County on 12 counts of murder.

Petr

then moved in the Superior Court for access to the transcript of
~--------------------------------------------------the preliminary
hearing.
~he court denied the motion, holding
~

that there was a "reasonable likelihood that making all or any
part of the transcript public might prejudice the defendant's
right to a fair and impartial trial."
Petr appealed to

th~ ~{i ;ornia

- - -- Court of Appeal.

The court

rejected petr's argument that the federal and state constitutions
established a right of access to preliminary hearings.

Although

acknowledging that this Court had recognized a First Amendment

v--

right of access to criminal trials, see Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457

u.s.

596 (1982), and that some courts had

extended this right to certain pretrial proceedings, the court
~

followed an earlier decision of the California Supreme Court, San
Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal.

3d 498 (1982), in

holding that a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is
probable cause to proceed against a defendant is different enough
from a trial to make the right of access inapplicable.

Turning

--

to California Penal Code §868, which provides that "upon the
request of the defendant and a finding by the magistrate that

--

exclusion of the public is necessary in order to protect the
fair an

impart1al trial, the magistrate

___:;>
shall exclude from the examination every person except

[the

-3defendant, the attorneys, and court personnel]," the court held
that an order excluding the public and the press

requi~d

--

~

(~

a

showing that there was a "reasonable likelihood of substantial
prej dice" to the defendant if the proceedings were not

closed. ~

Under the circumstances of this case, the standard was satisfied:
the case had received extensive press coverage, the evidence

- --

-----:;:;

presented at the preliminary hearing was exclusively inculpatory,
-·- ~

and the hearing involved the presentation of inadmissible \
evidence and prejudicial remarks.

-------------------------

Press access to the

preliminary hearing would create the risk that Diaz would be
deprived of his right to an impartial jury, and alternatives to
closure were inadequate, as the only viable alternative to
closure was a change of venue that would deny Diaz his right to
I

be

~d

in Riverside County and his right to a speedy trial.

The Court of Appeal therefore affirmed the closure order.
Petr successfully

~lifornia

Supreme

moot because (1)
~

soug ~cretionary

Court~Noting

that the

review in the

c~ was

technically

the transcript of the hearing had been made

II

available when Diaz waived his right to a jury trial and (2)

the

trial was over, the court nonetheless addressed the merits on the
~

ground that "the case presents an important question affecting
the public interest."

Petn App A-2, n.

2.

The court affirmed

the Court of Appeal's determination that there is no First
Amendment right of access to preliminary hearings in criminal
cases.

~

Like the lower court, the California Supreme Court

recognized that this Court has held that there is such a right
access to trials, see Globe Newspaper Co., supra, and to some

-4.(

pretrial proceedings, see Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,
104 s.ct. 819 (1984)

(voir dire).

The court, however, stuck to

the reasoning of its earlier decision in San Jose Mercury, supra:
a preliminary hearing, in which often only the prosecution's
evidence is presented and from which the public has historically
been excluded, is materially different from a trial, and the
First Amendment right of access is therefore inapplicable.
The court, however, held that California Penal Code §868
' - -·-- ...

- --·

-·-- -·-

--------

preserve the
defendant's right to a fair trial.

To give content to the

---~

s t"atu fe'S-· requirement of "necessity," the court weighed the
values served by openness against the potential dangers of open
proceedings.

The court noted that access to judicial proceedings

helped educate the public about the workings of the system,
inspired public confidence in the system, tended to minimize the
possibility of persecution, favoritism and other forms of abuse,
and served a cathartic function for the community as a whole.
Moreover, the preliminary hearing was often the sole adversarial
proceeding in a criminal case, and sometimes involved the
resolution of important questions regarding admissibility of
evidence and police misconduct.

~~

On the other hand, the court

observed that the presentation of evidence at a preliminary

~ hearing

was

often~isleading a~ one-sided,

as the hearing's

primary function was to determine whether the prosecution's case
justified a trial.
....,.·

Moreover, the magistrates conducting such

hearings were more likely than trial judges to err in rulings on

-5evidence, with the result that prejudicial and inadmissible
information might be disclosed at the hearing.

Thus, public

access to preliminary hearings might distort the public's
perception of the defendant's guilt or innocence and thereby
infringe on his right to an impartial jury selected from his own
community.
The court concluded that these concerns were properly
balanced--and the statutory requirement of "necessity" satisfied-by a standard under which preliminary hearings could be closed
on the basis of "a substantial showing of potential prejudice" to
the defendant.

The court noted that petr urged that the proper

test was whether there was a "substantial probability of
irreparable damage" whereas Diaz asserted that only "a reasonable
likelihood of substantial prejudice" need be shown.

Although

questioning the significance of the difference between the two
standards, the court accepted Diaz's formulation, holding that
the statutory standard for closure was satisfied when the
defendant established "a reasonable likelihood of substantial
prejudice."

That standard having been satisfied in this case,

the court affirmed.
Justice Grodin concurred in the court's treatment of the
statutory issue, but rejected the court's analysis of the
constitutional issue as unnecessary to the result.

He would not

have reached the question whether a First Amendment right of
access existed, for he was satisfied that if such a right
existed, it did not require an open hearing when the defendant

-6~

established that public access would result in a reasonable
likelihood of substantial prejudice.
Justice Lucas dissented from the majority's statutory
analysis.

Section 868, he argued, required that preliminary

hearings be open unless closure was "necessary" to protect the
defendant's rights.

In his view, the statute meant what it said:

the defendant had to establish not just that prejudice was
reasonably likely unless the hearing were closed, but that
closure was absolutely necessary to prevent injustice.

Despite

his disagreement with the majority, however, Justice Lucas
concurred in the judgment.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

In his view, the case was moot.

Petr contends that the courts are divided

over whether there is a First Amendment right of access to
preliminary hearings in criminal cases.

Four federal courts of

appeals, petr contends, have held that the right of access
extends to pretrial criminal proceedings.

Application of the

Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93 (CA2 1984); United States v. Chagra,
F.2d 354

701

(CAS 1983); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162

(CA9 1982); United States v. Criden,

675 F.2d 550 (CA3 1982).

In

addition, many state courts have held that the right of access
covers pretrial proceedings, and a few of these cases have
specifically involved preliminary hearings.
Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 459 A.2d 641 (1983)

See, e. g., State v.

(preliminary hearing to

determine probable cause); Petition of the Daily Item, 310 Pa.
Super.

222, 456 A.2d 580 (1983)

(same); Kearns-Tribune Co. v.

Lewis,

685 P.2d 515

(same).

(Utah 1984)

Other state courts,

however, have held that the right of access does not extend to

'~

-7preliminary hearings.

Dickinson Newspapers, Inc. v. Jorgensen,

338 N.W.2d 72 (N.D. 1983): Steinle v. Lollis, 279 S.C. 375, 307
S.E.2d 230 (1983).

This case, petr suggests, offers an

opportunity to resolve this issue.
In addition, petr argues that those courts that recognize
the right of access are in disarray over the question of when
closure is permissible.

The CA9 has held in Brooklier, supra,

that the First Amendment permits closure only when the defendant
shows a substantial probability of irreparable damage if the
proceedings are open, a substantial probability that alternatives
to closure will be ineffective, and a substantial probability
that closure will effectively protect the defendant's rights.
The CA3 in Criden, supra, required the defendant to show that
closure is "necessary" to preserve his rights.

The CAS, however,

requires only that the defendant show that his right to a fair
trial is likely to be prejudiced unless proceedings are closed,
that alternatives to closure are inadequate, and that closure
will probably be ineffective.

Chagra, supra.

And the CA2 has

adopted an even more relaxed standard, requiring only a
"signficant risk of prejudice" and a finding that closure is
"preferable" to available alternatives.
100.

Herald Co., supra, at

The state courts, petr contends, have adopted a variety of

disparate standards.
Petr also argues that the analysis employed by the
California Supreme Court in rejecting a right of access to
preliminary hearings is inconsistent with this Court's recent
decisions regarding the right of access to criminal proceedings

-8(Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, supra; Globe Newspaper
~o.,

supra; Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 u.s. 555

(1980)).

These opinions have not tended to stress the historical

question whether a particular proceeding has traditionally been
open or closed, but have instead focused on the function of
public access to criminal proceedings.

Public access, the Court

has reasoned, helps discourage misconduct on the part of the
participants, educates the public about the workings of the
judicial system, reduces public distrust of the system, and
serves a therapeutic or cathartic function by allowing the
community to observe justice being done.

These functional

reasons for access are as applicable to preliminary hearings as
to full trials; indeed, the preliminary hearing may often be the
most important proceeding in a case, and important questions may
be resolved at the preliminary stage.

Accordingly, the right of

access should extend to preliminary hearings.
Finally, petr contends that the statutory standard devised
by the California courts is insufficient to protect the
constitutional right of access.

In Press-Enterprise Co. v.

Superior Court, supra, the Court stated that closure of a
proceeding "must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs
the value of openness."

104 s.ct., at 824.

The Court stressed

that closure is permissible only when it "is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest."

Ibid.

The loose standard articulated by the

California Supreme Court, permitting closure based only on a
showing of reasonable likelihood that open proceedings will

-9preiudice the defendant, does not live up to these strict
standards.
Several members of the press, as amici curiae, have
submitted a brief in support of the petition for certiorari.
They argue that the preliminary hearing is a critical phase in
the criminal process, arid that a right of access to the
preliminary hearing serves precisely the same First Amendment
values as does the right of access to the trial itself.
Accordingly, the California court erred in rejecting a right of
access.

In addition, amici assert that the standard for closure

devised by the California court is so loose as to assure closure
whenever a defendant requests it.
4.
I

~~~~·

DISCUSSION:

Under ordinary standards, this case is

Petr ultimately obtained access to the transcript of the

---------- '---------

preliminary proceeding, and the criminal trial ended long ago.
Mootness, however,

is no obstacle to review of this case: most of

---·-

this Court's right of access cases have concerned proceedings
that are completed, but the Court has decided them on the ground
that they are "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
Globe Newspaper Co., 457

u.s.,

u.s.,

at 596: Richmond Newspapers, 448

at 563: Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,

(1979).

See

443

u.s.

368, 377-378

This reasoning would seem equally applicable here.

Petr's claims of conflict among the state and federal
courts, however, are somewhat exaggerated.

Most of the cases

petr cites as upholding a right of access to pretrial proceedings
deal with proceedings that occur after a grand jury or magistrate

.______

____..,..

~

has determined that the charges against the defen ant are

-10supported by probable cause--for example, suppression hearings
and jury selection proceedings.

All of the federal cases cited

by petr fall into this category, as do most of the state cases.

~Prel1m1nary
. .

h

.
~ however, present problems different
ear1ngs,

from the other pretrial proceedings with which the cases petr
cites are concerned.
the

s~

The preliminary hearing serves essentially\

function as proceedings before the grand jur . the

--------

.

. .

-~

prosecution presents 1ts case, and some neutral dec1s1onmaker
(the magistrate in a preliminary hearing, or a grand jury where
an ind ic tmen t

is required)

determines whether this essentially

one-sided presentation establishes probable cause for further
- -- - - - --

proceedings against the defendant.

7

This Court's

pr ~es ~

establishing a right of access to trials (and to such pretrial
I

~~

proceedings as voir dire, see Press-Enterprises Co. v. Superior
Court, supra)

don't necessarily require that the same analysis be

applied to preliminary hearings or grand jury proceedings, where
the traditional concern for secrecy reflects a well-founded fear
that the public may mistake the evidence introduced to establish
probable cause as proof of guilt.
Nonetheless, petr does cite two cases from state courts of
last resort that decide the right of access question in a manner
contrary to the decision of the California Supreme Court in this
case.

State v. Williams,

93 N.J. 39, 459 A.2d 641 (1983);

Kearns-Tribune Co. v. Lewis,

685 P.2d 515

(Utah 1984).

I don't

believe, however, that these decisions entail the sort of
conflict that this Court need resolve.

In both cases, the courts

explicitly recognized that this Court's decisions leave it

-11-

uncertain whether the First Amendment right of access extends to
the preliminary hearing; and although the courts expressed the
view that the First Amendment right does apply to preliminary
hearings, they carefully held that this result follows from their
state constitutions regardless of whether the federal
constitutional right of access is implicated.

In addition, both

courts held that the right of access was adequately protected by
a standard allowing closure on a showing of a reasonable
likelihood of prejudice--precisely the same standard arrived at
on nonconstitutional grounds by the California court.

Given that

all three courts arrived at the same standard on grounds other
than the First Amendment, the conflict among their unnecessary
pronouncements on the existence of a First Amendment right of
access does not strike me as one that must be resolved.
Although I do not believe the conflict alleged by petr is
independently certworthy, the issue presented is one that the
Court might want to resolve.

There are important distinctions
~---------·-· ........
~nd_

between the preliminary hearing involved in this case

the

~

proceedings to which the Court has recognized a right of access,

-------

but petr is correct in noting that many of the qoncerns
underlying the right of access to trials are equally applicable
where preliminary hearings are concerned.

In addition, petr

correctly points out that the courts have been somewhat confused
about the proper formulation of the test for closure of a
proceeding to which there is a right of access.

Some courts have

spoken of substantial probabilities of irreparable injury, others
of reasonable likelihoods, and still others of "necessity."

-12Whether these distinctions make a difference in practice is
unclear, but some courts seem to believe that they do.

Thus, if

the Court is inclined to continue its project of expanding the
right of access, and if it believes that the "reasonable
likelihood of prejudice" standard for closure is inadequate to
protect that right (or that the proper standard requires
clarification), a grant here would be a possibility (although a
CFR would be a prerequisite).
Given the distinction between the preliminary hearing and
the other proceedings to which the Court has recognized a right
of access, the absence of a square conflict, and the significant
level of protection of public access afforded by the
court on nonconstitutional grounds, however, I

l

5.
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I recommend denial.

There is no response.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

February 22, 1986

From: Bob
No.84-1560

THE PRESS ENTERPRISE CO.

v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA

To be argued, Wednesday, February 26, 1986

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether
ings,

the public's

right of access

to criminal proceed-

guaranteed by the United States Constitution First Amend-

ment, extends to pretrial proceedings, in particular, preliminary
~

hearings.

"5 ~ ~ It>

If-'

~ 4>~ ~,.,

'R4

t. K ~ ~ 5/C 1- ~ 1-v-c..~

t.-1 ,;t:-

page 3.

The

defendant opposed

trial

judge

found

the motion.

that

the

Although

the

su_Eerior court

information contained

in

the

tran-

script was neither inflammatory or exciting, he nonetheless found
that there was a

"reasonable likelihood that release of all or

any part of the transcript might prejudice defendant's right to a
fair

trial."

unseal

the

The trial court,

therefore,

On appeal,

transcripts.

the

denied the request to
court of

appeals

held

that there was no constitutional right of access to preliminary
hearings.

The California Supreme Court agreed, and further con-

- -------

____

- ------·--- -

close the preliminary hearing upon finding a

----

,,reasonable

likeli-

hood of substantial prejudice
.........___ which would impinge upon the
to a fair trial." fi;;ti on

8ijH provides

in pertinent part:

"The examination shall be open and public. However, upon the request of the defendant and a finding by
the magistrate that exclt;tsion of the public is ''necess~" in order to protec't the defendant's r ignt to a
fair and impartial trial, the magistrate shall exclude
from the examination every person except the clerk,
court reporter .... "
'(

~--~-~~/L

<C--

c.....--~r_:~

~

r"'·'11.... ... 1 u-f

~-- "

~'"

II. DISCUSSION

I

am

by

far

more

persuaded

by

the

arguments

advanced

by

petrs and amici than I am by respondents in this case. Virtually
all of the policies that favor a constitutional right of access
to criminal trials,
find

such a

v"" Gannet

Co.

support a right of access here.

holding consistent with
v.

DePasquale,

443

U.S.

y~
368

Further,

I

views as expressed in

(1979),

and other

free

V"'

press opinions that you have joined. Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464

u.s.

/

J

~)
~~

501 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superi-

page 4.

or

Court,

457

u.s.

596

(1982).

Indeed,

the California Supreme

Court in this very case pointed out that it acknowledged the benefit in the openness in such a proceeding, and the similarities
between a preliminary hearing and a trial:
"Exposure of government functions to public view
serves societal interests in a democratic government.
Open preliminary hearings guard against persecution and
favoritism, increase public awareness of the judicial
process, inspire confidence in the criminal justice
system, and serve the cathartic needs of the community.
Preliminary hearings are an important step in the accusatorial process.
There are many similarities to trial; witnesses may be cross-examined, each side has an
incentive to prevail, and the hearing may reveal weaknesses in the prosecution or defense, forecasting the
ultimate disposition.
Often the preliminary hearing turns out to be the
only judicial proceeding of a substantial importance
that takes place during a criminal prosecution because
so many cases are disposed of without trial. The hearing often provides the forum for issues involving police misconduct and exclusion of evidence."l
This latter point comes close to tracking your point in Gannett

that

"suppression

hearings

often are

as

important

as

the

trial which may follow." Gannett, supra, at 397 n.l. Indeed, here

lpetr suggests that suppression hearings are a regular bill of
fare at preliminary hearings in California.
Indeed respondent
Diaz claims that often charges are dismissed or reduced in a
significant number of cases following the preliminary hearing and
that those "redu~tions are often obtained by suppressing evidence
and otherwise exposing holes in the prosecution's case" rather
than by proving an affirmative defense. Later, however,
respondent Diaz takes issue with petr's claim that suppression
motions are "a standard part of the bill of fare" of preliminary
.L
hearings in California. Diaz contends that it is "undeniably )
~r
true" that preliminary hearings ~be ''joined with suppression ~
hearings, motions to dismiss and other motions that raise
~. ___ ___ I
co~tutiona~ • . . . However, the hearings remain
~
distinct and it should be possible to separate th t stimony,
cl
e prelim'nar h aring, and open the qth_ers." This may be
a fertile ground or questioning at oral argument.

cp.s

page 5.

it can be said that access is more important because no trial may
follow.

Petr also points out that at the preliminary hearing the

defendant has a

right to present an affirmative defense such as
"-------~

alibi, self-defense, or
through

cross

entrapment, and may develop that defense

examination or

by calling witnesses.

California

applies its Evidence Code, with a minor exception, to the preliminary

hearing.

Constitutional

objections

can

be

raised

to

the

admissibility of confessions and the admissibility of eye-witness
identifications.

Finally, the magistrate has powers similar to a

judge at trial.
Respondents arguments on the other hand consist largely of
arguments that could similarly be applied to trials in general.
-------------~.__.....____~------------------

For example,
~

respondent Diaz argues that the cathartic reaction

of the community comes from seeing harsh penalties not from observing trials;

and that

indeed the public might become enraged

to be able to know that at a preliminary hearing one can get off
on a technicality.

Many other of respondents'

arguments simply

come too late in the day to rebut the benefit of public access to
this kind of a procedure.
Other arguments, such as the fact that often only the prosecuter's

evidence

is

presented

and

that

therefore

the

public

would be confused by allowing reporting on the event, strike me
as arguments in favor of public education, rather than closure of
preliminary hearings.

On the other hand,

a constant barrage of

negative information may be more difficult to counterbalance than
reporting

of

both

sides

at

trial.

Respondent Superior Court's

argument that a right of access here will lead inevitably to ac-

~

~-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------page 6.

cess to such things as prosecutor's
files and grand jury proceed____..__
ings also strikes me as just silly.
My reading of the briefs does not leave the impression that
the preliminary hearing
investigation,
clear.

in California

is

akin

to

a grand

and any opinion would probably want to make that

First, the preliminary hearing is not an arm of the

ecution,
against

and

jury

the

focus

of

the defendant,

the

not

inquiry

is

to test

the de-

fendant.
The only question from reading the earlier cases is whether
you believe it important that there be some solid tradition and
history of open pretrial proceedings.

In Gannett, you were unde-

terred by the majority's analysis that pretrial proceedings were
traditionally not open.
case

distinguished

cussed

in

the

On the other hand,

suppression

majority.

Indeed

hearings

the dissent in that

from

it declared

those
"It

is

being

dis-

significant

that the sources upon which the Court relies do not concern suppression hearings.

They concern hearings to determine probable

cause to bind a defendant over
fenses Act,
Code Ann.

11
§868

&

12 Viet.

ch.

(West Supp.

(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting)

for
42,

1979)."

trial. E.g.,
§§17,

19

Gannett,

Indictable Of-

(1848);
443

Cal.

u.s.,

Penal
at

437

(emphasis added).

In a well done brief, Amicus American Newspaper Publishers

--

________.

Association, et al., points out that under English law the magistrate was originally an arm of
investigating

crime.

Thus,

the prosecution and involved in

to say that

f-

~6....

G-/~

pros- ~~

the evidence

to produce evidence against

I'VtA!J

those proceedings were

closed is not helpful because those proceedings were simply not

page 7.

analogous

to the preliminary hearing at

issue here.

While

the

Colonies apparently followed the English practice, pre-trial proceedings became "decidedly public affairs"
risdictions.
court

In

retained

public,

the

few

authority

the power

American
to

close

in most American ju-

jurisdictions
pretrial

in

which

proceedings

to

the
the

remained "in judicial dormancy and day-to-day

disuse." Geis, Preliminary Hearings and the Press, 8 u.c.L.A. L.
Rev.

397, 407

tion was

a

(1961).

small

Geis goes on to point out that an excep-

bloc of

states,

California

among

them,

which

adopted a unique provision of the Field Code that permitted closing the hearing on the request of the defendant. Petr contends,
then,

that

hearing.
\..____-.-

a

This

presumption

of

presumption of

openness
openness

attends
can

the

be met

preliminary
by the point

made by the majority opinion in Gannett, "The petitioner and amici appear to argue that since exclusion of members of the public
is relatively rare,

there must be a constitutional public right

to a public trial.

This argument,

however, confuses the exist-

ence of a constitutional right with the common-law tradition of
open civil and criminal proceedings." Gannett, supra, 443 u.s. at
389.

Thus, the opennenss of the pre-trial hearing perhaps cannot

be compared

to the openness of

the trial for which "historical

evidence demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England
had long

been presumptively open.

This

is no quirk of history;

rather, it has long been recognized as an indispensable attribute
of an Anglo-American trial." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569

( 1980)

(Opinion of Burger, J.) •

page 8.

In the end, I think that the larger historical point should
not focus on the history behind particular proceedings, but rather on the fact

that the roots of this country's

judicial proc-

esses are set in the soil of openness. Cf. Globe Newspaper Co.

v~

Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 n.l3 (rejecting contention that
because trials involving testimony by minors in sex-crime cases
has not been traditionally open, then there is no constitutional
requirement that they be open).

When open procedures further the

interests that led our ancestors to open trials, then the constitutional protection should be there afforded as well. When a proceeding bears

such a

similarity in form and consequence to the

actual trial itself, I am not persuaded that any historical argument should stand in the way of a recognition of a constitutional
~

right.
your

I think that such a view is consistent with the tenor of
v""
-- ---· ~ - - · ·- - -dissent in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 u.s. 843

------------~~

(1974).
If you agree that the First Amendment protects the right of
access to these procedures, then the Court can remand to the Cal-

~~

"

4 ~~

ifornia Court to be given an opportunity to construe its statute
--- ~-----.....__.--"'

in conformity with the recognition of the constitutional right.

- -----·--·-------

The California Court required simply a showing of a "likelihood
of ~ s ~a ~~dice"

in

the

fair

trial

context.

This

is

concur-

indeed very close to the standard

renee in Gannett (whether fair trial 'likely to be

jeopardized") -;'~

and you may think that that is all that need be said on it. The
California Court here, however, although it cited to your concurrenee

in Gannett,

arguably did

not

require

a

consideration of

page 9.

alternatives,

a requirement that the exclusion be only as great

as necessary to meet the goal of achieving a fair

trial,

and a

requirement that the press be heard, all of which you made reference to in Gannett.

Thus, I think you would even want to reverse

based on the standard applied below.
simply be

required that

On the other hand it may

this Court provide some guidance as to

the type of balancing that must be done in a case such as this,
and leave to the California Court the precise implementation of
that balancing.
Because

Justice

Blackmun,

as

pointed

out

in

the

opinion

below, adopted a standard in his Gannett dissent that would make
it much more

d iff icul t

~~

this case has

for

an accused

the potential for

to have a

trial closed,

resurrecting the difference be-

tween your approach and that of the dissenters in Gannett.
To avoid having to decide that issue, the Court may simply

-

~

~
/

want to remand with the general guidance provided by a case such
as

v.Waller

v.

Georgia,

104

s.

Ct.

2210,

2216

Amendment case which nonetheless borrowed from
ment principles of earlier cases.

(1984),

a

Sixth

the First Amend-

In that case you wrote:

"Under Press-Enterprise,
the party seeking to
close the hearing must advance an overriding interest
that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no
broader than necessary to protect that interest, the
trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to
closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure."
I would go further than this, however.

If the Court finds a

constitutional right of access to these pretrial hearings, I do
not think it should avoid the question of the standard to be ap-

~

page 10.

plied in reconciling the constitutional right of access with the
constitutional right to a fair trial.
I I I. CONCLUSION

I

recommend that you reverse the judgment of the California

Supreme Court,
standard

to

be

and offer guidance to lower courts on the proper
used

to

reconcile

the

rigqts at issue in a case such as this.

competing

constitutional
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84-1560 Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court
(Calif. Supreme Court - Argued 2/26/86
MEMO TO BOB:
This case presents an

interesting

and difficult

question:
"Whether
the
public's
right
of
access
to
criminal proceedings, guaranteed by the First
Amendment, extends to preliminary hearings of
the kind authorized under California law?"
As
identify
case.

my

It

preliminary

1

will

want

primary
pertains
hearing

your

views,

concern

-

to

nature

in

the

as

I

California

Bob,

will

only

now understand

this

and

purpose

criminal

Accordingly to the California Supreme Court,
California
absolute

Code

right

was
to

amended

closure,

to

and

access to preliminary hearings.

I

delete

the

to establish

of

the

procedure.
§869 of the
defendant's
a

right

of

As amended, §868 reads as

follows:
"The examination shall be open and public.
However, upon the request of the defendant and a
finding by the magistrate that exclusion of the
public is necessary in order to protect the
defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial,
the
magistrate
shall
exclude
from
the
examination
[all
but
certain
enumerated
officials, defendant and his counse 1, and the
prosecuting witness and a friend]."

.-

,

If

fact,

in

preliminary

hearings

proceedings,

as

are

analogous

it would be easy

California

suggested,

is

to

a

grand

jury

to affirm the decision of

the California Supreme Court that the press properly may
be

excluded.

nature

of

If,

on

preliminary

briefs of petitioner,
amici,
hearing

(See,
in

e.g.,

effect

the

hearings

hand,
is

as

the

purpose

described

in

and
the

and particularly the briefs of the

brief
is

other

by

Baker

a preliminary

& Hostetler),

trial.

such

Amici

a

briefs

set forth at length the "rights" provided the defendant at
such a hearing, and they do resemble - to a large extent the same rights enjoyed by a defendant at a trial.
In

this

case

over a 41-day period.

the

preliminary

The magistrate

hearing

extended

(these hearings are

conducted before a magistrate with no jury)

denied press

access, period on the motion of defendant, throughout this
entire period.
was

open

to

The magistrate ruled that
the

press

and

the

public,

if the hearin_g ,
the

pretrial

publicity - of this murder case - would make it virtually
impossible for defendant to obtain a fair trial.
It is not entirely clear that the finding by the
magistrate complied literally with the provisions of §868.
Amici briefs state,

in varying language, that preliminary

hearings

-

although

"probable cause" that

is,

a

their

purpose

often result

decision not

is

only

to

determine

in a final disposition -

to prosecute or a plea bargain.

The best brief on behalf of the respondent is that by the
County Counsel, Gerald Geerlings.
the

pretrial

procedure

"functionally

See his description of

that

different

than

he

a

characterizes

protects

and

trial

as

different societal goals".
The

parties

seem

to

agree

that

are

As 1 recall,

relevant decisions of this Court.
case

there

three

the only

in which we have considered specifically a pretrial

proceedings
(1979).

The

is

Gannett

v.

proceedings

at

motion to suppress evidence.

de

Pasquale,

issue

were

u.s.

443
on

the

368

familiar

It is not at all clear to me

that a motion to suppress is fairly analogous to the type
of preliminary hearing that prevails in California.
As 1 think

1 am far from at rest in this case.

-"

my votes in other cases indicate, 1 am generally inclined
toward

the

openness

perfectly clear

of

that

trial

in

procedures.

Yet,

it

is

some cases a pretrial procedure

can result in pervasive publicity that makes a subsequent
trial

difficult

substantial

if

not

competing

impossible.

rights.

A

Thus,
defendant

there

are

certainly

should

be

prevents

protected
a

fair

transfer red
On

for

the other

presence

of

the

trial,
trial

hand,
the

by

as

media

type

even

to a

of

where

different

some of
often

publicity
the

that

may

can

be

case

area of

the

state.

the briefs emphasize,

assure

fair

procedures

the
and

serve a public purpose.
This

case

should

be

written

narrowly

basis of the rather unique California procedure.
that

the

grand

California,
determined
in

a

and
-

jury

is

that

not

the

used
issue

or may be determined

preliminary

hearing

as

in
of

on

the

1 infer

criminal

cases

in

probable

cause

is

in appropriate cases -

a

substitute

for

an

information or a grand jury.

Bob,

1 will

not want a long bench memo.

1 would

like a summary of your views, and your recommendation.
can discuss the matter further.

L.F.P., Jr.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1560

PRESS-ENTERPRISE COMPANY, ETC., PETITIONER
v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA FOR
THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF CALIFORNIA ~ -

~
~~~-

~

()~ .

[June-, 1986]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari to decide wgether p tition~s a
First Amendment ri ht of access to transcripts of a preliminary hearing growing out of a crimina prosecutiOn.

I
On December 23, 1981 , the State of California filed a complaint in the Riverside County Municipal Court, charging
Robert Diaz with twelve counts of murder and seeking the
death penalty. The complaint alleged that Diaz, a nurse,
murdered twelve patients by administering massive doses of
the heart drug lidocaine. The preliminary hearing on the
complaint commenced on July 6, 1982. Diaz moved to exclude the public from the proceedings under California Penal
Code § 868, which requires such proceedings to be open
unless "exclusion of the public is necessa'r y in order to protect
the defendant's right to a fair trial." 1 The magistrate
' Section 868, as amended in 1982, provides in full:
"The examination shall be open and public. However, upon the request of
the defendant and a finding by the magistrate that exclusion of the public is
necessary in order to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, the magistrate shall exclude from the examination every person except the clerk,
court reporter and bailiff, the prosecutor and his or her counsel, the Attor-

~

~
~~-u

/. {;

~~j

"

84-1560-0PINION
2

PRESS-ENTERPRISE CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT

granted the unopposed motion, finding that closure was necessary because the case had attracted national publicity and
"only one side may get reported in the media." J. A. 23a.
The preliminary hearing continued for 41 days. Most of
the testimony an theevi ence presented bYthe State was
medical and scientific; the remainder consisted of testimony
by personnel who worked with Diaz on the shifts when the
twelve patients died. Diaz did not introduce any evidence,
but his counsel subjected!iiOStO~gorous
cross-examination. Diaz was held to answer on all charges.
At the conclusion of the hearing, petitioner Press-Enterprise
Com:
asked that the transcri t of the roceedings be released. The magistrate re sed an sealed e record.
OnJanuary 21, 1983, the State moved in Super-ior Court to
have the transcripts of the preliminary hearing released to
the public; petitioner later joined in support of the motion.
Diaz opposed the motion, contending that release of the transcripts would result in prejudicial pretrial publicity. The Superior Court found that the information in the transcript was
"as factual as it could be," and that the facts were neither "inflammatory" nor "exciting" but there was, nonetheless, "a
ney General, the district attorney of the county, the investigating officer,
the officer having custody of a prisoner witness while the witness is testifying, the defendant and his or her counsel, the officer having the defendant
in custody and a person chosen by the prosecuting witness who is not himself or herself a witness but who is present to provide the prosecuting witness moral support, provided that the person so chosen shall not discuss
prior to or during the preliminary examination the testimony of the prosecuting witness with any person, other than the prosecuting witness, who
is a witness in the examination. Nothing in this section shall affect the
right to exclude witnesses as provided in Section 687 of the Penal Code."
Before 1982, the statute gave the defendant the unqualified right to close
the proceedings. After the California Supreme Court rejected a First
Amendment attack on the old statute in San Jose Mercury-News v.
Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498 (1982), the California legislature amended
the statute to include the present requirement that the hearing be closed
only upon a finding by the magistrate that closure is "necessary in order to
protect the defendant's right to a fair trial."
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reasonable likelihood that release of all or any part of the
transcript might prejudice defendant's right to a fair trial."

J. A. 60.
Petitioner then filed a peremptory writ of mandate with
the Court of Appeal. That court originally denied the writ
but, after being so ordered by the California Supreme Court,
set the matter for a hearing. Meanwhile, Diaz waived his
right to a jury trial and the Superior Court released the transcript. After holding that the controversy was not moot, the
Court of Appeal denied the writ of mandate.
The California Supreme Court thereafter denied petitioner's peremptory writ of mandate, holding that there is no
general First Amendment right of access to preliminary
hearings. The court reasoned that the right of access to
criminal proceedings recognized in Press-Ent'erprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 464 U. S. 501 (1984) (Press-Enter-prise 1),
and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U. S. 596
37 Cal. 3d
(1982), extended only to actual criminal trials.
at 776. Furthermore, the reasons that had been ass,erted for
closing the proceedings in Press Enterprise I and Globe-the
interests of witnesses and other third parties-were not the
same as the right asserted in this case-the defendant's right
to a fair and impartial trial by a jury uninfluenced by news
accounts.
Having found no general First Amendment right of access,
the court then considered the circumstances in which the closure would be proper under the California access statute,
Penal Code § 868. Under the statute, the court reasoned, if
the defendant establishes a "reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice" the burden shifts to the prosecution or the
media to show by a preponderance of the evidence that there
is no such reasonable probability of prejudice. 37 Cal. 3d at
782.
~anted

(

ever e.

certiorari.

- - U. S. - - (1985).

We
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II
We must first consider whether we have (urisdicti~ under
Article III , § 2 of the Constitution. In this Cour(petitioner
challenges the Superior Court's original refusal to release the
transcript of the preliminary hearing. As noted above, the
specific relief petitioner seeks has already been granted-the
transcript of the preliminary hearing was released after Diaz
e
waived his right to a jury trial. Similar circumstan
presented in Globe Newspaper, supra, at 603, and annett v
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368,(377-378 (1979), whe
eld
that because controversies i volving public access to judicial
proceedings are "capable of repetition, yet evading review,"
such controversies do not become moot simply because the
relief sought has been granted. Globe and Gannett, therefore, require the conclusion that this case is not moot. Accordingly, we turn to the merits.
III
It is important to identify precisely what the California
Supreme Court decided:

-- ·--

". . . we conclude that the magistrate shall close the preliminary hearing upon finding a reasonable likelihood of
substantial prejudice which would impinge upon the
right to a fair trial. Penal code section 868 makes clear
that the primary right isthe ngfit to a fair trial and that
the public's right of access must give way when there is a
conflict."

It is difficult to disagree in the abstract with that court's
analysis balancing the defendant's right to a fair trial against
the public right of access. It is also important to remember
that these interests are not necessarily inconsistent.
Plainly, the· defen ant as a ng t to a air tnal ut, as we
have repeatedly recognized , one of the important means of
assuring a fair trial is that the process be open to neutral
observors.

lr
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The right to an open public trial is a shared right of the accused and the public, the common concern being the assurance of fairness. Only recently, in Waller v. Georgia, 467
U. S. 39 (1984), for example, we considered whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an open trial prevented
the closure of a suppression hearing over the defendant's objection. We noted that the First Amendment right of access
would in most instances attach to such proceedings and that
"the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less
protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment
right of the press and public." I d., at 46. When the defendant objects to the closure of a suppression hearing, therefore,
the hearing must be open unless the party seeking to close
the hearing advances an overriding interest that is likely to
be prejudiced. !d., at 47.
Here, unlike Waller, the right asserted is not the defendant'SSixth--Aii1eildment right to a public trial since the defendant requested a closed preliminary hearing. Instead,
the right asserted here is that of the press and public under
the First Amendment. The California Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment was not implicated because
the proceeding was not a criminal trial, but a preliminary
hearing. However, the First Amendment question cannot
be resolved solely on the label we give the event, i. e., "trial"
or otherwise, particularly where the preliminary hearing
functions much like a full scale trial.
In cases dealing with the claim of a First Amendment right
of access to criminal proceedings, our decisions have emphasized two complementary considerations. First, because a
"'tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of
experience'" Globe Newpaper, 457 U. S., at 605 (quoting
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555, 589
(1980) (JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment)), we
have considered whether the place and process has historically been open to the press and general public.

I

84-1560--0PINION
6

PRESS-ENTERPRISE CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT

In Press-Enterprise I, for example, we observed "that,
since tlf'e develo ment of triill. b~ jury, the process of selection of juror ha presumptively)_been a public process with
excej)tions on y or goo cause shown." 464 U. S., at 501.
In Richmond Newspapers, we reviewed some of the early
historyof"Englailcl'S'open trials from the day when a trial was
much like a "town meeting." In the days before the Norman
Conquest, criminal cases were brought before "moots," a collection of the freemen in the community. The public trial,
"one of the essential qualities of a court of justice" in England, was recognized early on in the colonies. There were
risks, of course, inherent in such a "town meeting" trial-the
risk that it might become a gathering moved by emotions or
passions growing from the nature of a crime; a "lynch mob"
ambience is hardly conducive to calm, reasoned decisionmaking based on evidence. Plainly the modern trial with jurors
open to interrogation for possible bias is a far cry from the
"town meeting trial" of ancient English practice. Yet even
our modern procedural protections have their origin in the
ancient common law principle which provided, not for closed
proceedings, but rather for rules of conduct for those who attend trials. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U. S., at 567.
Second, public access to the affairs of government does not
merit Constitutional protection unless it plays a significant
positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question. Globe Newspaper, 457 U. S., at 606. Although
many governmental processes operate best under public
scrutiny, it takes little imagination to recognize that the~
are some kinds of overnment o erations that would be tota y frustrated if conducted open y.
c ass1c example is
that "the proper functioning of our cgTand jury sys§fuj depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings." Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U. S. 211 , 218
(1979). Other proceedings plainly require public access. In
Press-Enterprise I, we summarized the holdings of prior
cases, noting that openness in criminal trials , including the

j
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selection of jurors, "enhances both the basic fairness of the
criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to
public confidence in the system." 464 U. S., at 501.
If the particular proceeding in question passes these tests
of experience and logic, a qualified First Amendment right of
public access attaches. The right of access, however, has
never been absolute. Globe Newspapers Co. v. Supenor
Court, 457 ~6, 606 (1981). While open criminal proceedings give assurances of fairness to both the public and
the accused, there are some limited circumstances in which
the right of the accused toa Iair~dermined by
publicity. 2 In sue cases, e tria court must etermine
w ether the situation is such that the rights of the accused
override the qualified First Amendment right of access. In
Press-Enterprise I we stated:
"the presumption may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest. The interest is to be articulated along
with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can
determine whether the closure order was properly entered." 464 U. S. at 501.
IV
A
The considerations that led the Court. to apply the First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials in Richmond
Newspapers and Globe and the selection of jurors in Press
Enterprise I lead us to conclude that the ri ht of access applies to preliminary earings as conducted in alifornia.

-

2

----------

-

Similarly, the rights of those other than the accused may be implicated. The protection of victims of sex crimes from the trauma and
embarrassment of public scrutmy may create a compelling need to close
certain aspects of a criminal proceeding. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-610 (1982).
--
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First, there has been a tradition of accessibility to preliminary hearings of the type conducted in California. Although
grand jury proceedings have traditionally been closed to the
public and the accused, preliminary hearings conducted before neutral and detached magistrates have been open to the
public. Long ago in the celebrated trial of Aaron Burr for
treason, for exam le with Chief Justice Marshall sitting as
trial judge, th probable cause earmg was held in the Hall of
the House of De egates m 1rgmia, t e court room being too
small to accommodate the crush of interested citizens.
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 1 (CCD. Va. 1807) (No. 14,
692)-:--Yrom Burr until the present day, the near uniform
practice of state and federal courts has been to conduct prelim~ hearings in opef!_court. 3 As we noted in Gannett,
~

3

The vast majority of states considering the issue have concluded that
the same tradition of accessibility that applies to criminal trials applies to
preliminary proceedings. See, e. g., Arkansas Television Co. v. Tedder,
281 'Ark. 152, 662 S. E. 2d 174 (1983); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Lewis, 426 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982); R. W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga.
569, 202 S. E. 2d 815, 819 (1982); Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 580
P. 2d 49, 56 (Hawaii 1978); State ex rei. Post-Tribune Publ. Co., 412 N. E.
2d 748 (Ind. 1980); Ashland Publishing Co. v. Asbury, 612 S. W. 2d 749,
752 (Ky. App. 1980); Great Falls Tribune v. District Court; 608 P. 2d 116
(Mont. 1980); Publishing Corp. v. Cheshire County Superior Court, 406 A.
2d 137 (NH 1979); State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39 (1983); Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, 399 N. E. 2d 518, 523 (NY 1979); Minot Daily
News v. Holum, 380 N. W. 2d 347 (ND 1986); State ex rei. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351 N. E. 2d 127 (Ohio 1976); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484, 503, 387 A. 2d 425, 434 (1978); KearnsTribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P. 2d 515 (Utah 1984); Herald Association,
Inc. v. Ellison, 419 A. 2d 323, 326 (Vermont 1980); Federated Publica·
tions, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 615 P. 2d 440 (1980); State ex rei .
Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 267 S. E. 2d 544 (W. Va. 1980); Williams v.
Stafford, 589 P. 2d 322 (Wyo. 1979). Compare In re Midland Publishing,
420 Mich. 148, 173 (1984) (proceedings leading to a person's indictment
have not been open to the public).
Other courts have noted that some pretrial proceedings have no historical counterpart, but, given the importance of the pretrial proce~ding to the
criminal trial, the traditional right of access should still apply. See, e. g.,
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several states following the original New York Field Code of
Criminal Procedure published in 1850 have allowed preliminary hearings to be closed on the motion of the accused. 443
U. S., at 390-391. But even in these states the proceedings
are presumptively open to the public and are closed only for
cause shown.~ Open preliminary hearings, therefore, have
been accorded "'the favorable judgment of experience."'
Globe, supra, at 605.
The second question is whether public access to _.greliminary hearings as tney are coffiftiCfea1n California plays a particularly s1gnifican pos11ve ro e in the actual functioning of
the process. We have already determined in Richmond
Newspapers, Globe, and Press Enterprise I that public access
t.o criminal trials and the selection of jurors is essential to the
proper functioning of the criminal justice system. California
preliminary hearings are sufficiently like a trial to justify the
same conclusion.
In California, to bring a felon to trial, the prosecutor has a
choice ofSeeuring a grand jury indictment or a finding of
probable cause following a preliminary hearing. But even
when the accused has been indicted by a grand jury, however, he has an ab olute right to an elaborate preliminary
hearin before a neutral magistrate. Hawkins v. Superior
Iowa Freedom of Information Council v. Wheat, 328 N. W. 2d 920 (Iowa
1983); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Kammeyer, 341 N. W. 2d 550
(Minn. 1983); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 281 S. E. 2d
915 (Va. 1981).
'See State v. McKenna, 78 Idaho 647, 309 P. 2d 206 (1957); Azbill v.
Fisher, 442 P. 2d 916 (Nev. 1968). Although Arizona, Iowa, Montana,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Utah have closure statutes based on the
Field Code, see Gannett, 443 U. S., at 391, in each of these states the
supreme court has found either a common law or state constitutitional right
of the public to attend pretrial proceedings. See Phoenix Newspapers,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257 (1966); Iowa Freedom of Information
Council v. Wheat, 328 N. W. 2d 920 (Iowa 1983); Great Falls Tribune v.
District Court, 608 P. 2d 116 (Mont. 1980); Minot Daily News v. Holum,
380 N. W. 2d 347 (ND 1986); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 414 A. 2d 318 (Pa.
1980); Keams-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P. 2d 515 (Utah 1984).
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Court 22 Cal. 3d 584 (1978). The accused has the right to
ersonall appean t the hearing, to be represented by counse , o cross-exa ine hostile witnesses, to present exculpatory evidence, and to exclude illegally obtained evidence.
Cal. Penal Code§§ 859-866, 1538.5. If the magistrate determines that probable cause exists, the accused is bound over
for trial; such a finding leads to a guilty plea in the majority of
cases.
It is true that unlike a criminal trial, the California preliminary hearing cannot result in the conviction of the accused
and the adjudication is before a magistrate or other judicial
officer without a jury. But these features, standing alone,
do not make public access any less essential to the proper
functioning of the proceedings in the overall criminal justice
process. Because of its extensive scope, the preliminary
hearing is often the fi~~y(nd most important step in the criminal proceeding. SeeVWaller v. Georgia, 467 U. S. 39, 46-47
(1984). As the California Supreme Court stated in San Jose
Mercury News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 510
(1982), the preliminary hearing in many cases provides "the
sole occasion for public observation of the criminal justice
system." See also Richmond Newspapers, supra, at 572.
Similarly, the absence of a jury, long recognized as "an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge,"
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 159 (1968), makes the
importance of public access to a preliminary hearing even
more significant. "People in an open society do not demand
infallability from their institutions, but it is difficult for them
to accept what they are prohibited from observing." Richmond Newspapers, supra, at 572.
Denying the transcri.E_ts . of a .g_jay preliminary hearing
would frustrate what we have characterized as the "community therapeutic value" of openness. I d., at 570. Criminal
acts, especially certain violent crimes, provoke public concern, outrage, and hostility. "When the public is aware that
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the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is
functioning, an outlet is provided for these understandable
reactions and emotions." Press Enterprise I, 464 U. S., at
509. See also H. Weihofen, The Urge to Punish 130-131
(1956); T. Reik, The Compulsion to Confess (1959). In sum,
"The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge
that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations
will become known. Openness thus enhances both the
basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of
fairness so essential to public confidence in the system."
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U. S., at 508. (emphasis in
original).
~
We therefore conclude that the qualified First Amendment
right of access to criminal proceedings applies to preliminary
hearings as they are conducted in California.
B
Since a qualified First Amendment right of access attaches
to preliminary hearings in California under Cal. Penal Code
§ § 858 et seq., the proceedings cannot be closed unless specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that
"closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Press-Enterprise I,
464 U. S., at 510. If the interest asserted is the right of the
accused to a fair trial, the preliminary hearing shall be closed
only if specific findings are made demonstrating that first,
there is a substantial probability that the defendant's right to
a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity and, second, reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the
defendant's free trial rights. See id.; Richmond N ewspapers, supra, at 581.
The California Supreme Court, interpreting its access stat-)
ute, concluded "that the magistrate shall close the prelimi-
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nary hearing upon finding a reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice." 37 Cal. 3d, at 781. As the court itself
acknowledged the "reasonable likelihood" test places a lesser
burden on the defendant than the "substantial probability"
test which we hold is called for by the First Amendment.
See id.; see also id., at 783 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting). Moreover, that court failed to consider whether alternatives short of complete closure would have protected the
inte ests of the accused.
In Gannett we observed that:
~hc1ty concerning pretrial suppression hearings such
as the one involved in the present case poses special
risks of unfairness. The whole purpose of such hearings
is to screen out unreliable or illegally obtained evidence
and insure that this evidence does not become known to
the jury. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368. Publicity concerning the proceedings at a pretrial hearing,
however, could influence public opinion against a defendant and inform potential jurors of inculpatory information wholly inadmissible at the actual trial."
443 U. S., at 378.
But this risk of prejudice does not automatically justify refusing public access to hearings on every motion to suppress.
Through voir dire, cumbersome as it is in some circumstances, a court can identify those jurors whose prior knowledge of the case would disable them from rendering an impartial verdict. And even if closure were justified for the
hearings on a motion to suppress, closure of an entire 41 day
proceeding would rarely be warranted. The First Amendment right of access cannot be overcome by the conclusory
assertion that publicity might deprive the defendant of that
right. And any limitation "must be narrowly tailored to
serve that interest." Press Enterprise, supra, at 510.
The standard applied by the California Supreme Court
failed to consider the First Amendment right of access to
criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the judgment of the

~

?

"
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California Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1560

PRESS-ENTERPRISE COMPANY, ETC., PETITIONER
v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA FOR
THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF CALIFORNIA
[June-, 1986]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether petitioner has a
First Amendment right of access to transcripts of a preliminary hearing growing out of a criminal prosecution.
I
On December 23, 1981, the State of California filed a complaint in the Riverside County Municipal Court, charging
Robert Diaz with twelve counts of murder and seeking the
death penalty. The complaint alleged that Diaz, a nurse,
murdered twelve patients by administering massive doses of
the heart drug lidocaine. The preliminary hearing on the
complaint commenced on July 6, 1982. Diaz moved to exclude the public from the proceedings under California Penal
Code § 868, which requires such proceedings to be open
unless "exclusion of the public is necessary in order to protect
the defendant's right to a fair trial." 1 The magistrate
' Section 868, as amended in 1982, provides in full:
"The examination shall be open and public. However, upon the request of
the defendant and a finding by the magistrate that exclusion of the public is
necessary in order to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, the magistrate shall exclude from the examination every person except the clerk,
court reporter and bailiff, the prosecutor and his or her counsel, the Attor-
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granted the unopposed motion, finding that closure was necessary because the case had attracted national publicity and
"only one side may get reported in the media." J. A. 23a.
The preliminary hearing continued for 41 days. Most of
the testimony and the evidence presented by the State was
medical and scientific; the remainder consisted of testimony
by personnel who worked with Diaz on the shifts when the
twelve patients died. Diaz did not introduce any evidence,
but his counsel subjected most of the witnesses to vigorous
cross-examination. Diaz was held to answer on all charges.
At the conclusion of the hearing, petitioner Press-Enterprise
Company asked that the transcript of the proceedings be released. The magistrate refused and sealed the record.
On January 21, 1983, the State moved in Superior Court to
have the transcripts of the preliminary hearing released to
the public; petitioner later joined in support of the motion.
Diaz opposed the motion, contending that release of the transcripts would result in prejudicial pretrial publicity. The Superior Court found that the information in the transcript was
"as factual as it could be," and that the facts were neither "inflammatory" nor "exciting" but there was, nonetheless, "a
ney General, the district attorney of the county, the investigating officer,
the officer having custody of a prisoner witness while the witness is testifying, the defendant and his or her counsel, the officer having the defendant
in custody and a person chosen by the prosecuting witness who is not himself or herself a witness but who is present to provide the prosecuting witness moral support, provided that the person so chosen shall not discuss
prior to or during the preliminary examination the testimony of the prosecuting witness with any person, other than the prosecuting witness, who
is a witness in the examination. Nothing in this section shall affect the
right to exclude witnesses as provided in Section 687 of the Penal Code."
Before 1982, the statute gave the defendant the unqualified right to close
the proceedings. After the California Supreme Court rejected a First
Amendment attack on the old statute in San Jose Mercury-News v.
Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498 (1982), the California legislature amended
the statute to include the present requirement that the hearing be closed
only upon a finding by the magistrate that closure is "necessary in order to
protect the defendant's right to a fair trial."
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reasonable likelihood that release of all or any part of the
transcript might prejudice defendant's right to a fair trial."
J. A. 60.
Petitioner then filed a peremptory writ of mandate with
the Court of Appeal. That court originally denied the writ
but, after being so ordered by the California Supreme Court,
set the matter for a hearing. Meanwhile, Diaz waived his
right to a jury trial and the Superior Court released the transcript. After holding that the controversy was not moot, the
Court of Appeal denied the writ of mandate.
The California Supreme Court thereafter denied petitioner's peremptory writ of mandate, holding that there is no
general First Amendment right of access to preliminary
hearings. The court reasoned that the right of access to
criminal proceedings recognized in Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 464 U. S. 501 (1984) (Press-Enterprise 1),
and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U. S. 596
(1982), extended only to actual criminal trials.
37 Cal. 3d
at 776. Furthermore, the reasons that had been asserted for
closing the proceedings in Press Enterprise I and Globe-the
interests of witnesses and other third parties-were not the
same as the right asserted in this case-the defendant's right
to a fair and impartial trial by a jury uninfluenced by news
accounts.
Having found no general First Amendment right of access,
the court then considered the circumstances in which the closure would be proper under the California access statute,
Penal Code§ 868. Under the statute, the court reasoned, if
the defendant establishes a "reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice" the burden shifts to the prosecution or the
media to show by a preponderance of the evidence that there
is no such reasonable probability of prejudice. 37 Cal. 3d at
782.
We granted certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1985). We
reverse.
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II
We must first consider whether we have jurisdiction under
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. In this Court, petitioner
challenges the Superior Court's original refusal to release the
transcript of the preliminary hearing. As noted above, the
specific relief petitioner seeks has already been granted-the
transcript of the preliminary hearing was released after Diaz
waived his right to a jury trial. Similar circumstances were
presented in Globe Newspaper, supra, at 603, and Gannett v.
DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 377-378 (1979), where we held
that because controversies involving public access to judicial
proceedings are "capable of repetition, yet evading review,"
such controversies do not become moot simply because the
relief sought has been granted. Globe and Gannett, therefore, require the conclusion that this case is not moot. Accordingly, we turn to the merits.
III
It is important to identify precisely what the California
Supreme Court decided:
"... we conclude that the magistrate shall close the preliminary hearing upon finding a reasonable likelihood of
substantial prejudice which would impinge upon the
right to a fair trial. Penal code section 868 makes clear
that the primary right is the right to a fair trial and that
the public's right of access must give way when there is a
conflict."
It is difficult to disagree in the abstract with that court's
analysis balancing the defendant's right to a fair trial against
the public right of access. It is also important to remember
that these interests are not necessarily inconsistent.
Plainly, the defendant has a right to a fair trial but, as we
have repeatedly recognized, one of the important means of
assuring a fair trial is that the process be open to neutral
observors.
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The right to an open public trial is a shared right of the accused and the public, the common concern being the assurance of fairness. Only recently, in Waller v. Georgia, 467
U. S. 39 (1984), for example, we considered whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an open trial prevented
the closure of a suppression hearing over the defendant's objection. We noted that the First Amendment right of access
would in most instances attach to such proceedings and that
"the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less
protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment
right of the press and public." I d., at 46. When the defendant objects to the closure of a suppression hearing, therefore,
the hearing must be open unless the party seeking to close
the hearing advances an overriding interest that is likely to
be prejudiced. !d., at 47.
Here, unlike Waller, the right asserted is not the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial since the defendant requested a closed preliminary hearing. Instead,
the right asserted here is that of the public under the First
Amendment. See Gannett, supra, at 397 (JUSTICE POWELL,
concurring). The California Supreme Court concluded that
the First Amendment was not implicated because the proceeding was not a criminal trial, but a preliminary hearing.
However, the First Amendment question cannot be resolved
solely on the label we give the event, i. e., "trial" or otherwise, particularly where the preliminary hearing functions
much like a full scale trial.
In cases dealing with the claim of a First Amendment right
of access to criminal proceedings, our decisions have emphasized two complementary considerations. First, because a
"'tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of
experience"' Globe Newpaper, 457 U. S., at 605 (quoting
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555, 589
(1980) (JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in judgment)), we
have considered whether the place and process has historically been open to the press and general public.

1
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In Press-Enterprise I, for example, we observed "that,
since the development of trial by jury, the process of selection of jurors has presumptively been a public process with
exceptions only for good cause shown." 464 U. S., at 501.
In Richmond Newspapers, we reviewed some of the early
history of England's open trials from the day when a trial was
much like a "town meeting." In the days before the Norman
Conquest, criminal cases were brought before "moots," a collection of the freemen in the community. The public trial,
"one of the essential qualities of a court of justice" in England, was recognized early on in the colonies. There were
risks, of course, inherent in such a "town meeting" trial-the
risk that it might become a gathering moved by emotions or
passions growing from the nature of a crime; a "lynch mob"
ambience is hardly conducive to calm, reasoned decisionmaking based on evidence. Plainly the modern trial with jurors
open to interrogation for possible bias is a far cry from the
"town meeting trial" of ancient English practice. Yet even
our modern procedural protections have their origin in the
ancient common law principle which provided, not for closed
proceedings, but rather for rules of conduct for those who attend trials. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U. S., at 567.
Second, in this setting the Court has traditionally considered whether public access plays a significant positive role in
the functioning of the particular process in question. Globe
Newspaper, 457 U. S., at 606. Although many governmental processes operate best under public scrutiny, it takes
little imagination to recognize that there are some kinds of
government operations that would be totally frustrated if
conducted openly. A classic example is that "the proper
functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings." Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol
Stops Northwest, 441 U. S. 211, 218 (1979). Other proceedings plainly require public access. In Press-Enterprise I, we
summarized the holdings of prior cases, noting that openness
in criminal trials, including the selection of jurors, "enhances
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both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system." 464 U. S., at 501.
These considerations of experience and logic are, of course,
related, for history and experience shape the functioning of
governmental processes. If the particular proceeding in
question passes these tests of experience and logic, a qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches. But
even when a right of access attaches, it is not absolute.
Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U. S. 596, 606
(1981). While open criminal proceedings give assurances of
fairness to both the public and the accused, there are some
limited circumstances in which the right of the accused to a
fair trial might be undermined by publicity. 2 In such cases,
the trial court must determine whether the situation is such
that the rights of the accused override the qualified First
Amendment right of access. In Press-Enterprise I we
stated:
"the presumption may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest. The interest is to be articulated along
with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can
determine whether the closure order was properly entered." 464 U. S., at 501.
IV
A
The considerations that led the Court to apply the First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials in R ichmond
Newspapers and Globe and the selection of jurors in Press
2
Similarly, the rights of those other than the accused may be implicated. The protection of victims of sex crimes from the trauma and
embarrassment of public scrutiny may create a compelling need to close
certain aspects of a criminal proceeding. See Globe Newspaper Co . v. Superior Court, 457 U. S. 596, 607-610 (1982).

[

I
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Enterprise I lead us to conclude that the right of access applies to preliminary hearings as conducted in California.
First, there has been a tradition of accessibility to preliminary hearings of the type conducted in California. Although
grand jury proceedings have traditionally been closed to the
public and the accused, preliminary hearings conducted before neutral and detached magistrates have been open to the
public. Long ago in the celebrated trial of Aaron Burr for
treason, for example, with Chief Justice Marshall sitting as
trial judge, the probable cause hearing was held in the Hall of
the House of Delegates in Virginia, the court room being too
small to accommodate the crush of interested citizens.
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 1 (CCD. Va. 1807) (No. 14,
692). From Burr until the present day, the near uniform
practice of state and federal courts has been to conduct preliminary hearings in open court. 3 As we noted in Gannett,
3
The vast majority of states considering the issue have concluded that
the same tradition of accessibility that applies to criminal trials applies to
preliminary proceedings. See, e. g., Arkansas Television Co. v. Tedder,
281 Ark. 152, 662 S. E. 2d 174 (1983); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Lewis, 426 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982); R. W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga.
569, 202 S. E. 2d 815, 819 (1982); Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 580
P. 2d 49, 56 (Hawaii 1978); State ex rel. Post-Tribune Publ. Co., 412 N. E.
2d 748 (Ind. 1980); Ashland Publishing Co. v. Asbury, 612 S. W. 2d 749,
752 (Ky. App. 1980); Great Falls Tribune v. District Court, 608 P. 2d 116
(Mont. 1980); Publishing Corp. v. Cheshire County Superior Court, 406 A.
2d 137 (NH 1979); State v. Williams, 93 N. J. 39 (1983); Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, 399 N. E. 2d 518, 523 (NY 1979); Minot Daily
News v. Holum, 380 N. W. 2d 347 (ND 1986); State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 351 N. E. 2d 127 (Ohio 1976); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484, 503, 387 A. 2d 425, 434 (1978); KearnsTribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P. 2d 515 (Utah 1984); Herald Association,
Inc. v. Ellison, 419 A. 2d 323, 326 (Vermont 1980); Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 615 P. 2d 440 (1980); State ex rel.
Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 267 S. E. 2d 544 (W. Va. 1980); Williams v.
Stafford, 589 P. 2d 322 (Wyo. 1979). Compare In re Midland Publishing,
420 Mich. 148, 173 (1984) (proceedings leading to a person's indictment
have not been open to the public).
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several states following the original New York Field Code of
Criminal Procedure published in 1850 have allowed preliminary hearings to be closed on the motion of the accused. 443
U. S., at 390-391. But even in these states the proceedings
are presumptively open to the public and are closed only for
cause shown. 4 Open preliminary hearings, therefore, have
been accorded "'the favorable judgment of experience.'"
Globe, supra, at 605.
The second question is whether public access to preliminary hearings as they are conducted in California plays a particularly significant positive role in the actual functioning of
the process. We have already determined in Richmond
Newspapers, Globe, and Press Enterprise I that public access
to criminal trials and the selection of jurors is essential to the
proper functioning of the criminal justice system. California
preliminary hearings are sufficiently like a trial to justify the
same conclusion.
In California, to bring a felon to trial, the prosecutor has a
choice of securing a grand jury indictment or a finding of
probable cause following a preliminary hearing. But even
Other courts have noted that some pretrial proceedings have no historical counterpart, but, given the importance of the pretrial proceeding to the
criminal trial, the traditional right of access should still apply. See, e. g.,
Iowa Freedom of Information Council v. Wheat, 328 N. W. 2d 920 (Iowa
1983); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Kammeyer, 341 N. W. 2d 550
(Minn. 1983); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 281 S. E. 2d
915 (Va. 1981).
• See State v. McKenna, 78 Idaho 647, 309 P. 2d 206 (1957); Azbill v.
Fisher, 442 P. 2d 916 (Nev. 1968). Although Arizona, Iowa, Montana,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Utah have closure statutes based on the
Field Code, see Gannett, 443 U. S., at 391, in each of these states the
supreme court has found either a common law or state constitutitional right
of the public to attend pretrial proceedings. See Phoenix Newspapers,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257 (1966); Iowa Freedom of Information
Council v. Wheat, 328 N. W. 2d 920 (Iowa 1983); Great Falls Tribune v.
District Court, 608 P. 2d 116 (Mont. 1980); Minot Daily News v. Holum,
380 N. W. 2d 347 (ND 1986); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 414 A. 2d 318 (Pa.
1980); Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P. 2d 515 (Utah 1984).

•
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when the accused has been indicted by a grand jury, however, he has an absolute right to an elaborate preliminary
hearing before a neutral magistrate. Hawkins v. Superior
Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584 (1978). The accused has the right to
personally appear at the hearing, to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine hostile witnesses, to present exculpatory evidence, and to exclude illegally obtained evidence.
Cal. Penal Code§§ 859-866, 1538.5. If the magistrate determines that probable cause exists, the accused is bound over
for trial; such a finding leads to a guilty plea in the majority of
cases.
It is true that unlike a criminal trial, the California preliminary hearing cannot result in the conviction of the accused
and the adjudication is before a magistrate or other judicial
officer without a jury. But these features, standing alone,
do not make public access any less essential to the proper
functioning of the proceedings in the overall criminal justice
process. Because of its extensive scope, the preliminary
hearing is often the final and most important step in the criminal proceeding. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U. S. 39, 46-47
(1984). As the California Supreme Court stated in San Jose
Mercury News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 510
(1982), the preliminary hearing in many cases provides "the
sole occasion for public observation of the criminal justice
system." See also Richmond Newspapers, supra, at 572.
Similarly, the absence of a jury, long recognized as "an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge,"
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 159 (1968), makes the
importance of public access to a preliminary hearing even
more significant. "People in an open society do not demand
infallability from their institutions, but it is difficult for them
to accept what they are prohibited from observing." Richmond Newspapers, supra, at 572.
Denying the transcripts of a 41 day preliminary hearing
would frustrate what we have characterized as the "commu-
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nity therapeutic value" of openness. I d., at 570. Criminal
acts, especially certain violent crimes, provoke public concern, outrage, and hostility. "When the public is aware that
the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is
functioning, an outlet is provided for these understandable
reactions and emotions." Press Enterprise I, 464 U. S., at
509. See also H. Weihofen, The Urge to Punish 130-131
(1956); T. Reik, The Compulsion to Confess (1959). In sum,
"The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge
that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations
will become known. Openness thus enhances both the
basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of
fairness so essential to public confidence in the system."
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U. S., at 508. (emphasis in
original).
We therefore conclude that the qualified First Amendment
right of access to criminal proceedings applies to preliminary
hearings as they are conducted in California.
B

Since a qualified First Amendment right of access attaches
to preliminary hearings in California under Cal. Penal Code
§§ 858 et seq., the proceedings cannot be closed unless specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that
"closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Press-Enterprise I,
464 U. S., at 510. See also Globe, supra, 457 U. S., at
606-607. If the interest asserted is the right of the accused
to a fair trial, the preliminary hearing shall be closed only if
specific findings are made demonstrating that first, there is a
substantial probability that the defenda t's right to a fair
trial will be rejudic b ublicit and that closure would
preven , secon , reasonable a ernatlves to closure cannot

r

\
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adequately protect the defendant's free trial rights. See id.;
Richmond Newspapers, supra, at 581.
The California Supreme Court, interpreting its access statute, concluded "that the magistrate shall close the preliminary hearing upon finding a reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice." 37 Cal. 3d, at 781. As the court itself
acknowledged the "reasonable likelihood" test places a lesser
burden on the defendant than the "substantial probability"
test which we hold is called for by the First Amendment.
See id.; see also id., at 783 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting). Moreover, that court failed to consider whether alternatives short of complete closure would have protected the
interests of the accused.
In Gannett we observed that:
"Publicity concerning pretrial suppression hearings such
as the one involved in the present case poses special
risks of unfairness. The whole purpose of such hearings
is to screen out unreliable or illegally obtained evidence
and insure that this evidence does not become known to
the jury. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368. Publicity concerning the proceedings at a pretrial hearing,
however, could influence public opinion against a defendant and inform potential jurors of inculpatory information wholly inadmissible at the actual trial."
443 U. S., at 378.
But this risk of prejudice does not automatically justify refusing public access to hearings on every motion to suppress.
Through voir dire, cumbersome as it is in some circumstances, a court can identify those jurors whose prior knowledge of the case would disable them from rendering an impartial verdict. And even if closure were justified for the
hearings on a motion to suppress, closure of an entire 41 day
proceeding would rarely be warranted. The First Amendment right of access cannot be overcome by the conclusory
assertion that publicity might deprive the defendant of that
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right. And any limitation "must be narrowly tailored to
serve that interest." Press Enterprise, supra, at 510.
The standard applied by the California Supreme Court
failed to consider the First Amendment right of access to
criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the judgment of the
California Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
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